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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ASTRONAUTICAL ENDEAVOURS
Introductory Remarks

Marco C. Bernasconi
The OURS Foundation, CH-8953 Dietikon, Switzerland

Paper IAA-95-IAA.8.1.01 presented at the XLVI International Congress of Astronautics, in Oslo (Norway),October 1995

Introduction

Ethics is not a scientific discipline, but part of philosophy, and the philosophers even after three thousand years of inquiry have not managed to develop a method for ascertaining which of their many statements are – if not true – at least truly relevant for this Universe. Therefore, turning to ethics to obtain a guide for future-oriented action, one just opens the floodgates for a profusion of arguments and counter-arguments, and for being submerged by a wave of, sometimes very elegant, verbiage. This is not at all helpful and, since the beholder is left to choose according to his own scale of values, the result is far from providing any comfort.

Thus, the fact that for many ethics is simply a convenient way to be “nice”, and an easy path for conferring force of law to their pet prejudices ought not to appear excessively surprising. But actually, here we are looking for something more and for something better founded.

In nature, all behaviours have a relation with the survival, either of the individual or of the species: it therefore seems a legitimate conclusion that any rules applied to the cultural behaviour of an intelligent species are directed toward the survival of either the individual or the society.

The astronautical endeavour can clearly be justified by a teleological approach to normative ethics, but most of the current practice seems to be founded on deontological principles. Furthermore, as the ethical debate cannot provide a unique, valid solution, it is necessary to argue for preserving the options which make it possible for different people to live in accordance to different set of rules. We are therefore reduced to an action of education and persuasion not very different from the empirical one generally advocated: and in this action the tools of the ethical philosophical debate can at most serve in a supporting role, and for discriminating among different courses of action.

Ethics as Philosophy

“Since survival is the sine qua non, I now define ‘moral behavior’ as ‘behavior that tends toward survival.’ I won’t argue with philosophers or theologians who choose to use the word ‘moral’ to mean something else, but I do not think anyone can define ‘behavior that tends toward extinction’ as being ‘moral’ without stretching the word ‘moral’ all out of shape.”
Robert A. Heinlein, 1973.

The current issue of the Britannica defines ethics as (Gewirth, 1985):

“… the branch of philosophy that is concerned with what is morally good or bad…; a synonym for it is moral philosophy.”

This looks rather like a circular definition. And, for a scientifically-oriented person, revisiting philosophy is a disconcerting experience – since as Heinlein (1980) wrote:

“In more than twenty-five centuries of effort not one basic problem of philosophy has ever been solved… but the efforts to solve them are most amusing…”

And yet, ethics is not only a fashionable field, it is also a necessary canon: as human beings, endowed with intelligence and conscience of the self, we cannot afford to be indifferent to the choice between right and wrong. And therefore we cannot afford to let ethics be tossed around in the philosophical ocean: it needs to be anchored to a concept (“the good”) which provides the possibility of testing the consequences of a doctrinal hypothesis. In a previous paper (Bernasconi, 1994), I have recalled and supported the separate definitions for ethics and morality given by Sturgeon (1956). Accordingly, ethics is defined as:

“the set of rules, by which an individual lives in a way that helps his species”

– in short:

“the code of conduct for the survival of society.”

The connection between ethics (a lofty topic, generally with spiritual overtones) and survival (the ultimate down-to-earth issue, often associated with trouncing and violence) may shock some sensitive minds, but it must be noted that survival is more than just physical survival: a survival of civilization encompasses the continuation of its values and aspirations – both the existing ones and others, yet to be conceived. Indeed, this is possibly the weakest point in this current model, since the mention of (the good) values and aspirations invokes ethical theory in a sort of recursive way. One possible, if preliminary, way out of this bind is to emphasize the survival of the whole: exquisite goals become absurd propositions if the price for striving towards them is the disappearance of their source. As Heinlein (1973) observed:

“We have two situations, mutually exclusive: Mankind surviving, and mankind extinct. With respect to morality, the second situation is a null class. An extinct breed has no behavior, moral or otherwise.”

The association of ethics and survival is an action in the metaethical domain: before we can begin to explicit the code of conduct (the normative ethics), we must assess the logic of it (metaethics).

Table 1: Contemporary Ethical Approaches

Ethical Approach	Comments
Anthropocentric	Classical rational approach, logically focusing of the self-interest of the actor.
Theocentric	Classical supernatural deontological approach; its culture-dependency undermines its own cognitive status.
Ecocentric	Fashionable materialistic approach aiming at “environmental justice.”
Pathocentric	Aims at the fulfillment of “natural rights” for all animal species capable to feel pain.
Biocentric	Aims at the extension of “natural rights” to all living species, including the botanical ones.
Physiocentric	This (temporarily?) last form of”ecological” extremism encloses also lifeless objects in its scope.

 

While the contemporary ethical discourses listed in Table 1 may not be the best of the most significant ones, those are the ones receiving most of the media attention.

What the physiocentric “ethics” really means is that the grains of the sands of Mars are as valuable as equal numbers of terrestrial human and animal beings.

I argue that we shall not suffer that value systems and codes of conduct diametrically opposed to truly ethical objectives be labeled as “ethics” simply because their proponents so wish to improve their stature: such antithetical constructs can only be designated as “anti-ethics.” The primary source of antiethical persuasions today is the immanent “ecozism” – for ecologist[ic] social-pacifism – an incoherent set of recipes built upon qualitative wishful thinking and bound to cause unprecedented amounts of suffering and destruction.

Ethics & Science

Mohr (1979) has held that the ethics of science is not “portable,” i.e. that it “is a partial ethic which can express its power only if the ultimate goal, the supreme good, is objective knowledge.” This ultimate goal clearly is encompassed within the wider ethos of survival, and therefore we have to subscribe to Mohr’s thesis: however important and exemplary, science by itself cannot provide the goals neither the ethics for humanity’s future.

Ethics & Technology

“It is important to distinguish between scientific and engineering objectives of [Astronautics] because the latter far transcend the engineering done in support of science objectives.”
K.A. Ehricke, 1970

The fact that science cannot provide a comprehensive objective and a comprehensive ethics applies both to society at large and to Astronautics in particular. As Ehricke (1970) observed in that context:

“[… Scientific] ‘laws’ are not part of human moral or social values per se.”

“Technology and engineering, on the other hand, interact profoundly with society and human values. Not all social aims involve engineering. But all engineering objectives certainly reflect social aims and, consequently, must be justified in terms of social and humanitarian objectives. In this sense, engineering objectives are different from, and transcend, intrinsically scientific objectives. In representing social objectives … they are ultimate objectives to which the public at large can relate and with which it can knowledgeably align itself.”

Again, it must be pointed out that the argument is subtly qualified: in arguing for technology’s societal relevance, Ehricke (1970) was not pre-empting Mohr’s (1979) postulate on the ambivalence of technological achievements: he underlined the stricter connection that exists between society’s aims and technology that – as a servant to humanity – can acquire an ethical goal only through its contribution towards the realization of a higher code.

Ethics & Astronautics

“The world may be divided into people who divide the world into two categories and those who do not.”
Anonymous

The Past

Ethical considerations have not been among the highest priorities of the founders of Astronautics, absorbed has they had to be (i) to show the practical feasibility of their “wild dreams” and (ii) to outline the rewarding applications that would ensue from them. In short, when at all reflecting on the issue, they held their enterprise to be amoral, rather than moral: Spaceflight is clearly justified (has a sound rationale) but not imperative (is not an ethical obligation).

In the postwar period, a number of authors did meditate on issues that clearly are related to Astronautics’ ethical aspects, but in most instances limited their analysis to specific, rationale-oriented cases (see, e.g., Haas, 1965), or addressed political issues (Cole, 1963) or wider questions related the development of technology in general (Wilcox, 1959): still, the community-at-large did not give much attention to this issue (nor has this situation changed in more recent times).

To this author’s knowledge, the earliest published discussion of Astronautics’ “philosophical” and “moral” issues is due to Krafft Ehricke (1957) who, however, did far more that simply list the problems requiring attention:

“… the fight for recognition of astronautics … has hardly begun. Astronautics is the science of operating in space and traveling to other worlds. The implications are such that it now becomes increasingly important to develop the philosophy, as well as the utilitarian aspects, of this new science.”

What was presented under the label of “anthropology” was in fact a first codified attempt (‘the Three Fundamental Laws’) of a humanistic, astronautical ethos, offered not in the form of interdictions or of useful objectives, but through positive statements: the structure is built on survival considerations, but the emphasis in on the survival of values and expansion “does not imply as desirable the brutal conquest of other worlds,” but is akin to the spread of life throughout this planet. The references to Renaissance and Enlightenment point to the intellectual sources of the concept.

The discussion of the ‘extraterrestrial imperative’ will later only build upon this foundation by analyzing near-term needs, subordinated to the general rules (Ehricke, 1970, 1971).

The Present

An “attempt to provide a coherent ethical foundation” for the astronautical endeavour was formulated by Duemler (1993). He proceeded from criteria for a sound ethical base (empirical evidence, biological plausibility, and inherent value) and logically examined various foundations to the light of those criteria, concluding that only pleasure and pain comply with all three (even life itself was rejected!). Scrutiny of the possible ensuing approaches led Duemler (1993) to the outcome of an aggregate, hedonistic, act-utilitarianism ethics determining that

“life which exists in a fulfilling environment… tends to be of positive value. [Therefore,] if life were spread throughout the… galaxy [… its total value] would thereby increase countless times.”

Experience shows that the harsh philosophical approach used to arrive at this (positive) conclusion, however, also ensures that a different philosopher will devise a different scheme – without any means to determine which is the better.

The decline in space activities stimulated the German Ministry for Research & Technology (BMFT) to support a study assessing the significance of manned spaceflight, whose conclusions have been summarized by Gethmann, Janich, & Sax (1993). This work moved beyond the conventional, descriptive, Technology Assessment approach through an interdisciplinary cooperation of engineering and philosophy. Normative statements from ethics were combined with descriptive examinations from space systems analysis. Both the norms for the ethical discourse and the aims to be justified through it were derived from the critical review of past and present discussions of manned space projects. The study identified four major justification categories:

• economic considerations
• scientific & technical justification schemes
• trans-utilitarian arguments
• the safeguarding of options

The first two categories were found to provide little ethical grounds (as defined above) for manned spaceflight; the third represented the collection of intangibles that has been summarized under the “inspirational drive” heading in a previous paper (Bernasconi & Woods, 1993): international cooperation, scientific education, etc. The last grouping is based in part on the synthesis of the preceding ones, but primarily on the consideration that forfeiting spaceflight could “cause future significant disadvantages, because certain options would be foreclosed, or could be made accessible again only with tremendous efforts and high risks.” From this perspective, the two examples of space power generation and of a manned Mars mission were examined, coming to the obvious conclusion that there is no urgency for a Martian adventure, while the energy studies “are indeed to be assessed as urgent.” (Gethmann, Janich, & Sax, 1993).

The study summary then concluded that “There is no single reason” for justifying manned spaceflight, and that this statement can be interpreted positively, in the sense that Astronautics is an

“endeavour that allows the simultaneous accomplishment of numerous dissimilar goals – and from this fact as well it acquires a distinctive meaning.”

Prudently, Gethmann, Janich, & Sax (1993) also warned about the importance of the communication effort: “The danger does exist that the repudiation of some objectives for manned spaceflight lead to its refusal in toto.” Elsewhere (Bernasconi, 1995), I have stressed the significance of the current gap in appreciation between the ‘space’ theme and the activities actually developed by the Agencies.

Two comments on this study may be in order. On the positive side, a widely interdisciplinary team arrived to a consensus recognition both of the importance of at least keeping the space options open and of the urgency to be attached to the associated developments. On the negative side, this work failed to provide the kind of firm answers needed to ensure an expeditious progress: this was due, on the detail level, to having fallen in the ‘manned spaceflight’ trap. (If Astronautics is a social tool, why distinguish between manned and automatic assets? In searching for means to achieve goals, one uses whichever item is better suited to the task at hand: in combat, a good commander does not a priori separates the artillery from the airborne fire power.) At a loftier level, it became apparent that ethics as vaguely defined in that context “cannot produce norms or values to be followed by society” (Grunwald, 1995).

Therefore, Grunwald (1995) has proposed the dual problem, to investigate “the various potential contributions of ethics to” Astronautics, through a two-stage research. First, “purposes and goals of space activities, technical means used, and the effects and impacts of the use of such means” are compiled and classified. Then, one proceeds to identify the decisions “showing a genuine ethical component [… a] task requir[ing …] an especially careful definition of what is meant by ‘genuinely ethical’.” The method’s aim is to disclose the decision-making problems for which ethics can offer orientation.

The Future

These two problems, i.e. to ethically assess the impact of Astronautics, and to identify specific space problems for which ethics can provide guidelines, do not exhaust the discourse on ethics and Astronautics. The most important question is whether an ethical plan for the future does need, or at least include, “space.”

Threats

The scarcity of ethical studies done by astronautical insiders, has left the field open to penetration by “mainstream thinkers” with little historical knowledge and even less competence of the specifics who – not surprisingly – have largely (if not exclusively) been preoccupied to keep the field as a playground for rich scientists and military people, under the best of cases. Typical examples (see Section 2.) are offered by the “scruples” expressed against planetary engineering or terraforming projects and by the ecozist attempts to imprison Earth’s life in its cradle.

Evolutionary Arguments

An evolutionary perspective recognizes that the passage of time is more than a subjective impression or the cause of the entropy increase. Similarly, it is often acknowledged that processes occur simultaneously at multiple, interrelated levels. For instance, Heinlein (1973) has referred to multiple level of ethical consciousness:

• own survival
• survival of direct relatives (immediate family)
• welfare of an extended unit (e.g., tribe)
• welfare of a group of too large for its members to be individually known (e.g., nation)
• survival of the whole species (humanity).

To this list, one may add:

• welfare of life forms in general.

Other authors have attempted an analysis of the ‘development of the world,’ wondering about the role, the potential, and the responsibility of humanity. Clearly, these images relate to the classical (and not very widespread) approach of ‘worrying for humanity,’ and to its extension into an ethical impulse for assuming responsibility for the common future of Earth’s life. The ‘responsibility for evolution’ is an element discussed (to different measures) by a number of authors (e.g., Vickers, 1973; Platt, 1981; Rubenstein, 1989; Dator, 1990).

Can such views be reconciled with a sound ethical approach as proposed in Section 2.? Only a tentative answer can be sketched here. Emphasis ought to be put on (i) the past impact of biological and cultural evolution (there is no pristine nature on the Earth surface, everything had been altered by life forms and human beings), (ii) the peculiar responsibility burden that self-awareness ties to intelligent life, (iii) the direct (preservation) and indirect (interest in the outcome) self-interest in continuing to “disturb the Universe.”

Table 2: Stages of Evolution (after Rubenstein, 1989)

Evolution Stage	Messengers	Duration [years]	Scale
Physical	Bosons	15 billion	Universe
Chemical	Atoms	3 billion	Concentrated matter (gas clouds, planets)
Biological	mRNA	<1 billion	Earth, ??
Cultural	Symbols (acoustic, graphic, body language)	3 million	Terrestrial land ecosystem
Directed Evolution	Human beings	10,000	Human society
Transhuman?	?	< 1000?	Universe?

 

Therefore, if survival provides the basic norm for ethics, the evolutionary argument adds the recognition that neither the Universe nor “natural life” are static constructs: therefore, ethical norms also have to transform and to embrace wider aims. And, from the analysis that leads to the observation of a directed evolution, follows the human responsibility for the Universe. The minimalist position has been expressed by Dator (1990) as follows:

“… it is not clear that humans can, or even should, attempt to design and govern evolution… Given the magnitude and complex interrelations of the challenges and opportunities before humans now… it seems unethical of us… [to] decide we cannot assume responsibility for the design and governance of future life.”

 

“I am not saying that humans should have reached this point; only that we have reached it, and that we should face this fact directly.”

Even from this minimalist perspective, arguing for mere ‘restoration’ or ‘dominance’ of nature is an irresponsible “loss of time.”

A New Humanism

I have christened the attempt to synthesize the vision and values of the space pioneers “Astronautical Humanism,” seen as an extension of scientific humanism, i.e. searching human self-realization “through the use of reason, scientific method, and space” (Bernasconi, 1994, 1995). Astronautical Humanism is based on a scientific view of the Universe, and naturally arrives to a systems-oriented, evolutionary approach. The human-primacy attitude of the survival ethos is reflected in a devotion to the general welfare, favouring material development to support its aims while understanding and caring for the nature’s web of life forms. Therefore, Astronautical Humanism advocates the use of extraterrestrial resources to sustain human civilization and support its development. The Space Option concept originates first from a status assessment and from survival considerations: as part of a truly ethical approach it transcends the astronautical plane, providing an element to the solution of the third problem mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.3.

Summary & Conclusions

“We must work toward a world in which nearly every individual will have a good deal of hope, a fair degree of personal prosperity, and a large measure of personal freedom.”
Howard A. Wilcox, 1959

Ethics must be redefined, moved into a more scientific (quantitative) ground, under the motto: “Ethics is too important to be left to the philosophers!” In real-world terms, it is not important to find ethical arguments to support ‘space activities:’ rather, the neo-ethical discourse ought require Astronautics – otherwise our model of the future is simply wrong!

A low-key interdisciplinary initiative is called for to create the such a neo-ethical ‘programming environment’ – and generalists, technologists, and mathematicians must be part of this effort even before (but not in the absence of) philosophers. Maybe the space lobby could use its expiring influence to support such an effort.

Acknowledgements

This paper presents the results of independent work done by the author for the OURS Foundation.The author would appreciate receiving your thoughts on empowering a good and ethical future through application of the ideas of the Astronautical Humanism.

References

1. Marco C. Bernasconi (1994). Humanity Facing the Future: A Role for Astronautics? Paper IAA-94-IAA.8.1.708 presented at the XLV International Astronautical Congress, Jerusalem (Israel), October 9-13.
2. Marco C. Bernasconi (1995). Astronautics – A New Product for Agencies’ Space Activities. A position paper for the Space 2020 Roundtable, ESTEC, 27-28 June.
3. Marco C. Bernasconi and Arthur R. Woods (1993). Implementing the Space Option: Elaboration and Dissemination of a New Rationale for Space / Part II: The Space Option. Paper IAA.8.1-93-764b.
4. Dandridge M. Cole (1963). Report on the Panama Theory. Fourth Western Meeting; also in: E. Burgess (editor).Advances in Astronautical Science 9, 229-238.
5. Jim Dator (1990). It’s Only a Paper Moon. Futures 22[10], 1084-1102.
6. David G Duemler (1993). An Ethical Foundation for Space Habitation. Space Manufacturing Facilities 9, 399-404.
7. Krafft A. Ehricke (1957). The Anthropology of Astronautics. Astronautics 2[11], 26-68.
8. Krafft A. Ehricke (1970). In-Depth Exploration of the Solar System and Its Utilization for the Benefit of Earth. Annals NY Academy Sciences 187, 427-456.
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14. Robert A. Heinlein (1973). James Forrestal Memorial Lecture, U.S. Naval Academy. Reprinted in: Robert A. Heinlein (1980). Expanded Universe. Ace Books, New York (NY), 459-470.
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20. Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1973). Making Institutions Work. Associate Business Programmes, London.
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The cover of the original  1995 paper included a copy (in b&w) of “Unity” – Claudine Varesi’s entry for the  OURS Foundation’s “Ars ad Astra” project – that recapitulates the evolutionary connection between humans and the Universe. With nineteen other works, the original painting was taken by ESA to the Mir space  station for an exhibition.